19416
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Not all of matter is animated, any more than a pond full of living fish is animated [Leibniz]
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Full Idea:
It must not be said that each portion of matter is animated, just as we do not say that a pond full of fishes is an animated body, although a fish is.
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From:
Gottfried Leibniz (Principle of Life and Plastic Natures [1705], p.190)
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A reaction:
This is a particularly clear picture of the role of monads in matter. Monads are attached to bodies, which are entirely inanimate, but monads suffuse matter and give it its properties, like particularly bubbly champagne. Cf Idea 19422.
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16954
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Generalised talk of 'natural kinds' is unfortunate, as they vary too much [Dummett]
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Full Idea:
In my view, Kripke's promotion of 'natural kinds', coverning chemical substances and animal and plant species, is unfortunate, since these are rather different types of things, and words used for them behave differently.
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From:
Michael Dummett (Could There Be Unicorns? [1983], 2)
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A reaction:
My view is that the only significant difference among natural kinds is their degree of stability in character. Presumably particles, elements and particular molecules are fairly invariant, but living things evolve.
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8430
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Causal statements are used to explain, to predict, to control, to attribute responsibility, and in theories [Kim]
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Full Idea:
The function of causal statements is 1) to explain events, 2) for predictive usefulness, 3) to help control events, 4) with agents, to attribute moral responsibility, 5) in physical theory. We should judge causal theories by how they account for these.
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From:
Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.207)
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A reaction:
He suggests that Lewis's counterfactual theory won't do well on this test. I think the first one is what matters. Philosophy aims to understand, and that is achieved through explanation. Regularity and counterfactual theories explain very little.
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8429
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Counterfactuals can express four other relations between events, apart from causation [Kim]
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Full Idea:
Counterfactuals can express 'analytical' dependency, or the fact that one event is part of another, or an action done by doing another, or (most interestingly) an event can determine another without causally determining it.
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From:
Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973], p.205)
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A reaction:
[Kim gives example of each case] Counterfactuals can even express a relation that involves no dependency. Or they might just involve redescription, as in 'If Scott were still alive, then the author of "Waverley" would be too'.
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4781
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Many counterfactual truths do not imply causation ('if yesterday wasn't Monday, it isn't Tuesday') [Kim, by Psillos]
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Full Idea:
Kim gives a range of examples of counterfactual dependence without causation, as: 'if yesterday wasn't Monday, today wouldn't be Tuesday', and 'if my sister had not given birth, I would not be an uncle'.
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From:
report of Jaegwon Kim (Causes and Counterfactuals [1973]) by Stathis Psillos - Causation and Explanation §3.3
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A reaction:
This is aimed at David Lewis. The objection seems like commonsense. "If you blink, the cat gets it". Causal claims involve counterfactuals, but they are not definitive of what causation is.
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