Combining Texts

Ideas for 'On Liberty', 'Natural Minds' and 'Causal Structuralism'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these texts

display all the ideas for this combination of texts


4 ideas

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
A mummified heart has the teleological function of circulating blood [Polger]
     Full Idea: A preserved heart in a jar of formaldehyde has the teleological function of circulating blood.
     From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], §5.4)
     A reaction: A nice illustration.
Teleological notions of function say what a thing is supposed to do [Polger]
     Full Idea: Teleological notions of function specify not just what a thing happens to do, but what it is supposed to do.
     From: Thomas W. Polger (Natural Minds [2004], Ch.5.3)
     A reaction: This is the basis of a distinct theory of the mind. It seems to be akin to the 'dispositions' of behaviourism, so that the mind becomes once more a theoretical and abstract entity, rather than a thing of occurrent events and processes.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns [Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: Perhaps science doesn't need a robust conception of causation, and can get by with thinking of causal laws in a Humean way, as the simplest generalization over the mosaic.
     From: John Hawthorne (Causal Structuralism [2001], 1.5)
     A reaction: The Humean view he is referring to is held by David Lewis. That seems a council of defeat. We observe from a distance, but make no attempt to explain.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 6. Laws as Numerical
We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else [Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: We know the laws of the physical world, in so far as they are mathematical, pretty well, but we know nothing else about it.
     From: John Hawthorne (Causal Structuralism [2001], Ch.25)
     A reaction: Lovely remark [spotted by Hawthorne]. This sums up exactly what I take to be the most pressing issue in philosophy of science - that we develop a view of science that has space for the next step in explanation.