display all the ideas for this combination of texts
5 ideas
11960 | Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization [Molnar] |
Full Idea: I take for granted the primacy of singular causation. A singular causal state of affairs is not constituted by a generalization. 'Aspirin relieves headache' is made true by 'This/that aspirin relieves this/that headache'. | |
From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 12.1) | |
A reaction: [He cites Tooley for the opposite view] I wholly agree with Molnar, and am inclined to link it with the primacy of individual essences over kind essences. |
11937 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa [Molnar] |
Full Idea: Causal analyses of powers pre-empt the correct account of causation in terms of powers. | |
From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 4.2.3) | |
A reaction: I think this is my preferred view. The crucial point is that powers are active, so one is not needing to add some weird 'causation' ingredient to a world which would otherwise be passive and inert. That is a relic from the interventions of God. |
11954 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers [Molnar] |
Full Idea: We should give up any causal analysis of powers, ..so we should try to analyse causation in terms of powers. | |
From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 8.5.3) | |
A reaction: It may be hard to explain what powers are, or identify them, if you can't say that they cause things to happen. I am torn between Molnar's view, and the view that causation is primitive. |
10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |
Full Idea: Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world. | |
From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1 | |
A reaction: Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out). |
11961 | Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa [Molnar] |
Full Idea: The counterfactual analysis is open to the Euthyphro objection: it is causal dependence that explains any counterfactual dependence rather than vice versa. | |
From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 12.1) | |
A reaction: I take views like the counterfactual analysis of causation to arise from empiricists who are bizarrely reluctant to adopt plausible best explainations (such as powers and essences). |