display all the ideas for this combination of texts
2 ideas
| 10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |
| Full Idea: Facts are not the sort of item that can cause anything. A fact is a true proposition (they say); it is not something in the world but is rather something about the world. | |
| From: Jonathan Bennett (Events and Their Names [1988], p.22), quoted by Jonathan Schaffer - The Metaphysics of Causation 1.1 | |
| A reaction: Compare 10361. Good argument, but maybe 'fact' is ambiguous. See Idea 10365. Events are said to be more concrete, and so can do the job, but their individuation also seems to depend on a description (as Davidson has pointed out). |
| 2117 | The connection in events enables us to successfully predict the future, so there must be a constant cause [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: There is a connection among our appearances that provides us the means to predict future appearances with success, and this connection must have a constant cause. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Foucher [1675]) |