display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
| 4071 | Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane] |
| Full Idea: A theory of causation might say 'If A had not existed, B would not have existed' (counterfactual theory), or 'B is more likely if A occurs' (probabilistic), or 'energy flows from A to B'. | |
| From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.11) | |
| A reaction: As always, it is vital to separate epistemology from ontology. Energy won't cover agents. Whisper "Fire!" in a theatre. |
| 4076 | Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane] |
| Full Idea: My view is that causes are properties (not events); when we look for causes, we look for the aspect of a situation which made a difference, and aspects are properties or qualities. | |
| From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.14) | |
| A reaction: He is talking about explanations, which may not be causes, or at least they have a different emphasis. Don't events 'make a difference'? Events are ontologically weird |
| 9215 | Causation is easier to disrupt than logic, so metaphysics is part of nature, not vice versa [Fine,K] |
| Full Idea: It would be harder to break P-and-Q implying P than the connection between cause and effect. This difference in strictness means it is more plausible that natural necessities include metaphysical necessities, than vice versa. | |
| From: Kit Fine (The Varieties of Necessity [2002], 6) | |
| A reaction: I cannot see any a priori grounds for the claim that causation is more easily disrupted than logic. It seems to be based on the strategy of inferring possibilities from what can be imagined, which seems to me to lead to wild misunderstandings. |