Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Natural Kinds and Biological Realism', 'The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism' and 'On the Reality of Accidents'

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4 ideas

26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt]
     Full Idea: Explanatory significance, hence naturalness, comes in degrees: positing some kinds may be very explanatory, positing others, only a little bit explanatory, positing others still, not explanatory at all.
     From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 4)
     A reaction: He mentions 'cousin' as a natural kind that is not very explanatory of anything. It interests us as humans, but not at all in other animals, it seems. ...Nice thought, though, that two squirrels might be cousins...
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis]
     Full Idea: There are natural kinds of processes.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3)
     A reaction: Interesting. I am tempted by the view that processes are the most basic feature of reality, since I think of the mind as a process, and quantum reality seems more like processes than like objects.
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis]
     Full Idea: Natural kind structures go all the way down to the most basic levels of existence.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3)
     A reaction: Even the bottom level? Is there anything to explain why the bottom level is a kind, given that all the higher kinds presumably have an explanation?
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis]
     Full Idea: The laws of nature must be supposed to be just descriptions of the ways in which things are intrinsically disposed to behave: of how they would behave if they existed as closed and isolated systems.
     From: Brian Ellis (The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism [2009], 3)
     A reaction: I agree with this, and therefore take 'laws of nature' to be eliminable from any plausible ontology (which just contains the things and their behaviour). Ellis tends to defend laws, when he doesn't need to.