Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Mahaprajnaparamitashastra', 'The Enneads' and 'Consciousness Explained'

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4 ideas

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
Originally there were no reasons, purposes or functions; since there were no interests, there were only causes [Dennett]
     Full Idea: In the beginning there were no reasons; there were only causes. Nothing had a purpose, nothing had so much as a function; there was no teleology in the world at all. The explanation is simple: there was nothing that had interests.
     From: Daniel C. Dennett (Consciousness Explained [1991], 7.2)
     A reaction: It seems reasonable to talk of functions even if the fledgling 'interests' are unconscious, as in a leaf. Is a process leading to an end an 'interest'? What are the 'interests' of a person who is about to commit suicide?
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
Soul is the logos of Nous, just as Nous is the logos of the One [Plotinus]
     Full Idea: The soul is an utterance [logos] and act of the Intellectual-Principle [Nous], as that is an utterance and act of the One.
     From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.06)
     A reaction: Being only comes into the picture at the secondary Nous stage. Nous is the closest to the modern concept of God.
Because the One is immobile, it must create by radiation, light the sun producing light [Plotinus]
     Full Idea: Given this immobility of the Supreme ...what happened then? It must be a circumradiation, which may be compared to the brilliant light encircling the sun and ceaselessly generating from that unchanging substance,
     From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.06)
     A reaction: This is the answer given to the problem raised in Idea 21814. The sun produces energy, without apparent movement. Not an answer that will satisfy a physicist, but an interesting answer.
How can multiple existence arise from the unified One? [Plotinus]
     Full Idea: The problem endlessly debated is how, from such a unity as we have declared the One to be, does anything at all come into substantial existence, any multiplicity, dyad or number?
     From: Plotinus (The Enneads [c.245], 5.1.06)
     A reaction: This was precisely Aristotle's objection to the One of Parmenides, and especially the problem of the source of movement (which Plotinus also notices).