display all the ideas for this combination of texts
6 ideas
14338 | In the 'laws' view events are basic, and properties are categorical, only existing when manifested [Mumford] |
Full Idea: In the 'laws' world view, events are the basic ontological unit and properties are parasitic upon them. Properties exist only in virtue of their instantiation in events. Properties are categorical, because they are only manifested in the present. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 10.2) | |
A reaction: Mumford rejects this view, and I am with him all the way. The first requirement is that properties be active, and not inert. See Leibniz on this. |
14339 | Without laws, how can a dispositionalist explain general behaviour within kinds? [Mumford] |
Full Idea: The problem is how, without general laws, can the dispositionalist explain why generalities in behaviour are true of kinds. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 10.3) | |
A reaction: And the answer is to make kinds depend on individuals, and not vice versa, and then point to the necessary patterns that arise from conjunctions of individual dispositions, given their identity in many individuals. |
14340 | It is a regularity that whenever a person sneezes, someone (somewhere) promptly coughs [Mumford] |
Full Idea: It is no doubt a true regularity that every time I sneeze, someone, somewhere in the world, immediately coughs. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 10.4) | |
A reaction: Not a huge problem for the regularity theory of laws, but the first challenge that it must meet. |
14341 | Dretske and Armstrong base laws on regularities between individual properties, not between events [Mumford] |
Full Idea: The improved Dretske/Armstrong regularity view of laws dispenses with the empiricist articulation of them in terms of events, and construes them as singular statements of fact that describe relations between properties. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 10.4) | |
A reaction: They then seem to go a bit mystical, by insisting that the properties are 'universals' (even if they have to be instantiated). Universals explain nothing. |
14345 | The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws [Mumford] |
Full Idea: The logical necessity of physical laws is not required by dispositional essentialism. An electron would not be an electron if its behaviour were different from the behaviour it has in the actual world, but this necessity is purely conceptual. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 10.8) | |
A reaction: [He is particularly aiming this at Ellis and Lierse 1994] This may be missing the point. Given those electron dispositions, the electrons necessitate law-like happenings. Whether a variable entity is called an 'electron' is trivial. |
14307 | Some dispositions are so far unknown, until we learn how to manifest them [Mumford] |
Full Idea: It seems reasonable to assume that there are some dispositions of some things of which we are not aware because we have not yet discovered the way to get these dispositions to manifest. | |
From: Stephen Mumford (Dispositions [1998], 03.7) | |
A reaction: This strikes me as a pretty good description of what scientists are currently doing when, for example, they build a new particle accelerator. |