Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Parmenides', 'Counting and the Natural Numbers' and 'Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd)'
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5 ideas
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
225
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The unlimited has no shape and is endless [Plato]
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Full Idea:
The unlimited partakes neither of the round nor of the straight, because it has no ends nor edges.
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From:
Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 137e)
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26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
233
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Some things do not partake of the One [Plato]
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Full Idea:
The others cannot partake of the one in any way; they can neither partake of it nor of the whole.
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From:
Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 159d)
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A reaction:
Compare Idea 231
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2062
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The only movement possible for the One is in space or in alteration [Plato]
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Full Idea:
If the One moves it either moves spatially or it is altered, since these are the only motions.
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From:
Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 138b)
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231
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Everything partakes of the One in some way [Plato]
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Full Idea:
The others are not altogether deprived of the one, for they partake of it in some way.
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From:
Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 157c)
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A reaction:
Compare Idea 233.
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
16847
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Counterfactual causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient [Lipton]
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Full Idea:
The counterfactual conception of causation makes causes necessary but not sufficient conditions for their effects.
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From:
Peter Lipton (Inference to the Best Explanation (2nd) [2004], 08 'From cause')
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A reaction:
Interesting. Then causes would be necessary, but would not necessitate. So what makes a cause sufficient?
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