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3 ideas
5445 | Essentialists regard inanimate objects as genuine causal agents [Ellis] |
Full Idea: Essentialist suppose that the inanimate objects of nature are genuine causal agents: things capable of acting or interacting. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Intro) | |
A reaction: I have no idea how one might demonstrate such a fact, even though it seems to stare us in the face. This is where science bumps into philosophy. I find myself intuitively taking the essentialist side quite strongly. |
5463 | Essentialists believe causation is necessary, resulting from dispositions and circumstances [Ellis] |
Full Idea: Essentialists believe elementary causal relations involve necessary connections between events, namely between the displays of dispositional properties and the circumstances that give rise to them. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.4) | |
A reaction: I like essentialism, but I feel a Humean caution about talk of 'natural necessity'. Let's just say that causation seems to be entirely the result of the nature of how things are. How things could be is a large topic for little mites like us. |
5491 | A general theory of causation is only possible in an area if natural kinds are involved [Ellis] |
Full Idea: A general theory of causation in an area is possible only if the kinds of entities under investigation can reasonably be assumed to belong to natural kinds. | |
From: Brian Ellis (The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism [2002], Ch.7) | |
A reaction: Human beings will be a problem, and also different levels of natural kinds (e.g. a chemical and an organism). 'Natural kind' is a very loose concept. He is referring to scientific, rather than philosophical, theories, I presume. |