15237
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Originally Humeans based lawlike statements on pure qualities, without particulars [Harré/Madden]
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Full Idea:
The original Humean suggestion was that lawlike statements must contain only purely qualitative predicates - that is, predicates which do not require in a statement of their meaning a reference to any particular object or spatio-temporal location.
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From:
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 2.II)
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A reaction:
Harré and Madden are keen to promote particulars (with powers) as the foundation of scientific theory, and I agree with them. It strikes me as quite elementary that generalisations arise from particulars, so can't fundamentally explain them.
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15241
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Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory [Harré/Madden]
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Full Idea:
Humeans say there can be no element of necessity in the causal relation because the conjunction of a description of a cause with the negation of a description of its usual effect is never self-contradictory.
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From:
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 3.I)
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A reaction:
We might say there actually is a contradiction, because you assert the existence of something, and then deny that existence by denying that the effect could occur. If the object is inert this is wrong, but if it is defined by its powers it is right.
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15239
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We could call any generalisation a law, if it had reasonable support and no counter-evidence [Harré/Madden]
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Full Idea:
There is a case for calling a generalisation a law when its only confirmation is the multiplication of instances, if they don't conflict with other criteria. In fact any supported generalisation could count as a law if there is no counter-evidence.
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From:
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 2.II)
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A reaction:
This is the beginning of the modern doubts about laws of nature, fully articulated in Mumford 2004. It seems to me inescapable that laws drop out if our ontology is based on powerful particulars. They are just patterns of outcome.
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