Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'On the Plurality of Worlds' and 'Causality: Reductionism versus Realism'

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3 ideas

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
Reductionists can't explain accidents, uninstantiated laws, probabilities, or the existence of any laws [Tooley]
     Full Idea: Reductionist accounts of causation cannot distinguish laws from accidental uniformities, cannot allow for basic uninstantiated laws, can't explain probabilistic laws, and cannot even demonstrate the existence of laws.
     From: Michael Tooley (Causality: Reductionism versus Realism [1990], 2)
     A reaction: I am tempted to say that this is so much the worse for the idea of laws. Extensive regularities only occur for a reason. Probabilities aren't laws. Hypothetical facts will cover uninstantiated laws. Laws are just patterns.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
Quantum physics suggests that the basic laws of nature are probabilistic [Tooley]
     Full Idea: Quantum physics seems to lend strong support to the idea that the basic laws of nature may well be probabilistic.
     From: Michael Tooley (Causality: Reductionism versus Realism [1990], 3.2.1)
     A reaction: Groan. Quantum physics should be outlawed from all philosophical discussions. The scientists don't understand it themselves. I'm certainly not going to build my worldview on it. I don't accept that these probabilities could count as 'laws'.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Causation is when at the closest world without the cause, there is no effect either [Lewis]
     Full Idea: If it is the case at world W that if event C had not occurred, E would not have occurred either, then the counterfactual means that at the closest worlds to W at which C does not occur, E does not occur either.
     From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.6)
     A reaction: This is a very Humean account, though updated, which sees nothing more to causation than transworld regularities. To me that is just describing the evidence for causation, not giving an account of it (even if the latter is impossible).