|
8404
|
Explain single events by general rules, or vice versa, or probability explains both, or they are unconnected [Field,H]
|
|
Full Idea:
Some think singular causal claims should be explained in terms of general causal claims; some think the order should be reversed; some think a third thing (e.g. objective probability) will explain both; and some think they are only loosely connected.
|
|
From:
Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 2)
|
|
A reaction:
I think Ducasse gives the best account, which is the second option, of giving singular causal claims priority. Probability (Mellor) strikes me as a non-starter, and the idea that they are fairly independent seems rather implausible.
|
|
15253
|
If the concept of a cause includes its usual effects, we call it a 'power' [Harré/Madden]
|
|
Full Idea:
The concept of cause may come to include the concepts of its usual effects. Concepts of this character are used in science, and in common language, to ascribe powers.
|
|
From:
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 3.II)
|
|
A reaction:
See Theme 8|c|3 in Theme/Structure for more ideas about powers. It's hard to see how you could specify a cause at all if you weren't allowed to say what it does. I love powers, and want to make them the key idea in all of metaphysics.
|
|
15278
|
Humean accounts of causal direction by time fail, because cause and effect can occur together [Harré/Madden]
|
|
Full Idea:
The Humean effort to ground the intuition of causal directionality on temporal priority of cause alone fails, because in fact some causes and effects are simultaneous. The moving of the knife and separation of the orange occur together.
|
|
From:
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 6.IV)
|
|
A reaction:
Since I take causation to be largely concerned with movements of 'energy', this idea that cause and effect might be simultaneous sounds more like a matter of pragmatics and convention. Moving the knife and moving the orange are different.
|
|
8401
|
Physical laws are largely time-symmetric, so they make a poor basis for directional causation [Field,H]
|
|
Full Idea:
It is sometimes pointed out that (perhaps with a few minor exceptions) the fundamental physical laws are completely time-symmetric. If so, then if one is inclined to found causation on fundamental physical law, it isn't evident how directionality gets in.
|
|
From:
Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 1)
|
|
A reaction:
All my instincts tell me that causation is more fundamental than laws, and that directionality is there at the start. That, though, raises the nice question of how, if causation explains laws, the direction eventually gets left OUT!
|
|
8402
|
The only reason for adding the notion of 'cause' to fundamental physics is directionality [Field,H]
|
|
Full Idea:
Although it is true that the notion of 'cause' is not needed in fundamental physics, even statistical physics, still directionality considerations don't preclude this notion from being consistently added to fundamental physics.
|
|
From:
Hartry Field (Causation in a Physical World [2003], 1)
|
|
A reaction:
This only makes sense if the notion of cause already has directionality built into it, which I think is correct. The physicist might reply that they don't care about directionality, but the whole idea of an experiment seems to depend on it (Idea 8363).
|
|
15217
|
Efficient causes combine stimulus to individuals, absence of contraints on activity [Harré/Madden]
|
|
Full Idea:
Efficient causes comprise both the presence of stimuli which activate a quiescent individual, and the absence or removal of constraints upon an individual already in a state of activity.
|
|
From:
Harré,R./Madden,E.H. (Causal Powers [1975], 1.II.B)
|
|
A reaction:
This is part of an account of causation in term of 'powers', with which I agree. Before you object, there is always going to be something about causation which is mind boggling weird, and probably leaves even God bewildered.
|