display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
| 2684 | Aristotle needed to distinguish teleological description from teleological explanation [Irwin on Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Aristotle does not distinguish teleological description and teleological explanation, or not as clearly as he should. | |
| From: comment on Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE]) by Terence Irwin - Metaphysical and psych. basis of 'Ethics' p.40 | |
| A reaction: I assume the explanation has to be factual and true, but the description might be a convenient way of focusing our view of something. |
| 5227 | The nature of any given thing is determined by its end [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The nature of any given thing is determined by its end. | |
| From: Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics [c.334 BCE], 1115b23) | |
| A reaction: A nice statement of the essence of the teleological view. A counterexample might be something which had a very unimpressive end, but was incidentally rather wonderful, like being a perfectionist about a menial task. |
| 12759 | There are atoms of substance, but no atoms of bulk or extension [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Although there are atoms of substance, namely monads, which lack parts, there are no atoms of bulk [moles], that is, atoms of the least possible extension, nor are there any ultimate elements, since a continuum cannot be composed out of points. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura) [1698], §11) | |
| A reaction: Leibniz has a constant battle for the rest of his career to explain what these 'atoms of substance' are, since they have location but no extension, they are self-sufficient yet generate force, and are non-physical but interact with matter. |
| 12718 | Secondary matter is active and complete; primary matter is passive and incomplete [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: I understand matter as either secondary or primary. Secondary matter is, indeed, a complete substance, but it is not merely passive; primary matter is merely passive, but it is not a complete substance. So we must add a soul or form... | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Nature Itself (De Ipsa Natura) [1698], §12), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4 | |
| A reaction: It sounds as if primary matter is redundant, but Garber suggests that secondary matter is just the combination of primary matter with form. |