display all the ideas for this combination of texts
4 ideas
18519 | If there were infinite electrons, they could vanish without affecting total mass-energy [Heil] |
Full Idea: In a universe containing an infinite number of electrons would mass-energy be conserved? ...Electrons could come and go without affecting the total mass-energy. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 03.6) | |
A reaction: This seems to be a very persuasive reason for doubting that the universe contains an infinite number of electrons. In fact I suspect that infinite numbers have no bearing on nature at all. (Actually, I suspect them of being fictions). |
18526 | We should focus on actual causings, rather than on laws and causal sequences [Heil] |
Full Idea: I believe our understanding of causation would benefit from a shift of attention from causal sequences and laws, to instances of causation: 'causings'. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 06.1) | |
A reaction: His aim is to get away from generalities, and focus on the actual operation of powers which is involved. He likes the case of two playing cards propped against one another. I'm on his side. Laws come last in the story, and should not come first. |
18527 | Probabilistic causation is not a weak type of cause; it is just a probability of there being a cause [Heil] |
Full Idea: The label 'probabilistic causation' is misleading. What you have is not a weakened or tentative kind of causing, but a probability of there being a cause. | |
From: John Heil (The Universe as We Find It [2012], 06.5) | |
A reaction: The idea of 'probabilistic causation' strikes me as an empty philosophers' concoction, so I agree with Heil. |
9659 | Causation is when at the closest world without the cause, there is no effect either [Lewis] |
Full Idea: If it is the case at world W that if event C had not occurred, E would not have occurred either, then the counterfactual means that at the closest worlds to W at which C does not occur, E does not occur either. | |
From: David Lewis (On the Plurality of Worlds [1986], 1.6) | |
A reaction: This is a very Humean account, though updated, which sees nothing more to causation than transworld regularities. To me that is just describing the evidence for causation, not giving an account of it (even if the latter is impossible). |