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6 ideas
4210 | If the concept of a cause says it precedes its effect, that rules out backward causation by definition [Lowe] |
Full Idea: You can't include in your concept of causation a clause stipulating that the cause occurred earlier than the effect, because that would rule out backward causation by definition. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.176) | |
A reaction: It may, though, be the case that backward causes can't occur, and time is essential to causes. The problem is our inability to know this for sure. |
4209 | The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration [Lowe] |
Full Idea: The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.173) | |
A reaction: This is slippery ground because both 'facts' and 'events' have uncertain ontological status, and seem partly conventional rather than natural. Events might be natural surges or transformations of energy? |
4215 | It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers [Lowe] |
Full Idea: It seems proper to say that events of themselves possess no causal powers; only persisting objects (individual substances) possess causal powers. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.211) | |
A reaction: This requires events to be reduced to substances, which invites Aristotle's question of where the movement comes from. In physcis, 'energy' is the key concept. |
4211 | Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case [Lowe] |
Full Idea: In causation there is 'overdetermination' (c and d occurred, and were both sufficient for e), 'pre-emption' (c and d occurred, and d would have stepped in if c hadn't), or 'fail-safe' (if c hadn't occurred, d would have occurred and done it). | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.179) | |
A reaction: Two safety nets together, two safety nets spaced apart, or a second net which pops in if the first breaks. Nice distinctions. |
4213 | Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities) [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Causation relations between events may an instance of a causal law, with laws either interpreted as constant conjunctions (Hume), or as necessitation among universals (Armstrong). | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.190) | |
A reaction: Hume's version is a thin idea of a law, but we can dream about the metaphysical status of laws, even if we don't know much about them. Lowe says a cause without a law is perfectly intelligible. |
4212 | Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity [Lowe] |
Full Idea: One thing Hume has taught us is that the necessity which causation involves is at most 'natural' or 'physical' necessity, not metaphysical necessity. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (A Survey of Metaphysics [2002], p.182) | |
A reaction: Given Hume's epistemological scepticism, I don't think he would claim to have shown such a thing. See G.Strawson's book. Metaphysical necessity of causation is possible, but unknowable. |