Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Elements of Mind', 'Properties' and 'The Problem of the Essential Indexical'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     choose another area for these texts

display all the ideas for this combination of texts


4 ideas

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane]
     Full Idea: A theory of causation might say 'If A had not existed, B would not have existed' (counterfactual theory), or 'B is more likely if A occurs' (probabilistic), or 'energy flows from A to B'.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.11)
     A reaction: As always, it is vital to separate epistemology from ontology. Energy won't cover agents. Whisper "Fire!" in a theatre.
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane]
     Full Idea: My view is that causes are properties (not events); when we look for causes, we look for the aspect of a situation which made a difference, and aspects are properties or qualities.
     From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.14)
     A reaction: He is talking about explanations, which may not be causes, or at least they have a different emphasis. Don't events 'make a difference'? Events are ontologically weird
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer]
     Full Idea: If laws were mere regularities, then the fact that observed Fs have been Gs would give us no reason to conclude that those Fs we haven't encountered will also be Gs.
     From: Chris Swoyer (Properties [2000], 4.2)
     A reaction: I take this simple point to be very powerful. No amount of regularity gives grounds for asserting future patterns - one only has Humean habits. Causal mechanisms are what we are after.
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer]
     Full Idea: If properties are identical when they confer the same capacities on their instances, different properties seem able to bestow the same powers (e.g. force), and one property can bestow different powers (attraction or repulsion).
     From: Chris Swoyer (Properties [2000], 4.2)
     A reaction: Interesting, but possibly a misunderstanding. Powers are basic, and properties are combinations of powers. A 'force' isn't a basic power, it is a consequence of various properties. Relational behaviours are also not basic powers, which are the source.