display all the ideas for this combination of texts
7 ideas
4071 | Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane] |
Full Idea: A theory of causation might say 'If A had not existed, B would not have existed' (counterfactual theory), or 'B is more likely if A occurs' (probabilistic), or 'energy flows from A to B'. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.11) | |
A reaction: As always, it is vital to separate epistemology from ontology. Energy won't cover agents. Whisper "Fire!" in a theatre. |
1894 | Some say that causes are physical, some say not [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: Some affirm cause to be corporeal, some incorporeal. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.14) |
1896 | If there were no causes then everything would have been randomly produced by everything [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If causes were non-existent everything would have been produced by everything, and at random. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.18) |
1897 | Knowing an effect results from a cause means knowing that the cause belongs with the effect, which is circular [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: To know an effect belongs to a cause, we must also know that that cause belongs to that effect, and this is circular. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.21) |
1898 | Cause can't exist before effect, or exist at the same time, so it doesn't exist [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: If cause neither subsists before its effect, nor subsists along with it, nor does the effect precede the cause, it would seem that it has no substantial existence at all. | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.27) |
4076 | Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane] |
Full Idea: My view is that causes are properties (not events); when we look for causes, we look for the aspect of a situation which made a difference, and aspects are properties or qualities. | |
From: Tim Crane (Elements of Mind [2001], 2.14) | |
A reaction: He is talking about explanations, which may not be causes, or at least they have a different emphasis. Don't events 'make a difference'? Events are ontologically weird |
1895 | Causes are either equal to the effect, or they link equally with other causes, or they contribute slightly [Sext.Empiricus] |
Full Idea: The majority say causes are immediate (when they are directly proportional to effects), or associate (making an equal contribution to effects), or cooperant (making a slight contribution). | |
From: Sextus Empiricus (Outlines of Pyrrhonism [c.180], III.15) |