display all the ideas for this combination of texts
6 ideas
11960 | Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization [Molnar] |
Full Idea: I take for granted the primacy of singular causation. A singular causal state of affairs is not constituted by a generalization. 'Aspirin relieves headache' is made true by 'This/that aspirin relieves this/that headache'. | |
From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 12.1) | |
A reaction: [He cites Tooley for the opposite view] I wholly agree with Molnar, and am inclined to link it with the primacy of individual essences over kind essences. |
4579 | The idea of a final cause is very uncertain and unphilosophical [Hume] |
Full Idea: Your sense of 'natural' is founded on final causes, which is a consideration that appears to me pretty uncertain and unphilosophical. | |
From: David Hume (Letters [1739], to Hutcheson 1739) | |
A reaction: This is the rejection of Aristotelian teleology by modern science. I agree that the notion of utterly ultimate final cause is worse than 'uncertain' - it is an impossible concept. Nevertheless, I prefer Aristotle to Hume. Nature can teach us lessons. |
11937 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa [Molnar] |
Full Idea: Causal analyses of powers pre-empt the correct account of causation in terms of powers. | |
From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 4.2.3) | |
A reaction: I think this is my preferred view. The crucial point is that powers are active, so one is not needing to add some weird 'causation' ingredient to a world which would otherwise be passive and inert. That is a relic from the interventions of God. |
11954 | We should analyse causation in terms of powers [Molnar] |
Full Idea: We should give up any causal analysis of powers, ..so we should try to analyse causation in terms of powers. | |
From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 8.5.3) | |
A reaction: It may be hard to explain what powers are, or identify them, if you can't say that they cause things to happen. I am torn between Molnar's view, and the view that causation is primitive. |
11961 | Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa [Molnar] |
Full Idea: The counterfactual analysis is open to the Euthyphro objection: it is causal dependence that explains any counterfactual dependence rather than vice versa. | |
From: George Molnar (Powers [1998], 12.1) | |
A reaction: I take views like the counterfactual analysis of causation to arise from empiricists who are bizarrely reluctant to adopt plausible best explainations (such as powers and essences). |
20705 | That events could be uncaused is absurd; I only say intuition and demonstration don't show this [Hume] |
Full Idea: I never asserted so absurd a proposition as that anything might arise without a cause: I only maintained that our certainty of the falsehood of that proposition proceeded neither from intuition nor from demonstration, but from another source. | |
From: David Hume (Letters [1739], 1754), quoted by Brian Davies - Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 5 'God' | |
A reaction: Since the other source is habit, he is being a bit disingenuous. While rational intuition and demonstration give a fairly secure basis for the universality of causation, mere human habits of expectation give very feeble grounds. |