Combining Texts
Ideas for
'The Fixation of Belief', 'The Ethics' and 'Causation'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
21 ideas
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
|
17190
|
We can easily think of nature as one individual [Spinoza]
|
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
|
4826
|
Nature has no particular goal in view, and final causes are mere human figments [Spinoza]
|
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
|
1587
|
Spinoza strongly attacked teleology, which is the lifeblood of classical logos [Roochnik on Spinoza]
|
|
1588
|
For Spinoza eyes don't act for purposes, but follow mechanical necessity [Roochnik on Spinoza]
|
|
12731
|
Final causes are figments of human imagination [Spinoza]
|
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
|
4821
|
An infinite line can be marked in feet or inches, so one infinity is twelve times the other [Spinoza]
|
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
|
17177
|
In nature there is just one infinite substance [Spinoza]
|
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
|
6939
|
What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce]
|
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. Final causes
|
4850
|
A final cause is simply a human desire [Spinoza]
|
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
|
8427
|
I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis]
|
|
8405
|
A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H]
|
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
|
10392
|
It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis]
|
|
8419
|
The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis]
|
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
|
8421
|
Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis]
|
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
|
17524
|
Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird]
|
|
8397
|
Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis]
|
|
8423
|
My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis]
|
|
8426
|
One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis]
|
|
17525
|
The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird]
|
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
|
4815
|
From a definite cause an effect necessarily follows [Spinoza]
|
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
|
4795
|
Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis]
|