Combining Texts
Ideas for
'fragments/reports', 'Scientific Essentialism' and 'Causation and Supervenience'
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18 ideas
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
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13583
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There might be uninstantiated natural kinds, such as transuranic elements which have never occurred [Ellis]
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26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
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13574
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Natural kinds are distinguished by resting on essences [Ellis]
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26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
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13575
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If there are borderline cases between natural kinds, that makes them superficial [Ellis]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
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8388
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Causation is either direct realism, Humean reduction, non-Humean reduction or theoretical realism [Tooley]
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8389
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Causation distinctions: reductionism/realism; Humean/non-Humean states; observable/non-observable [Tooley]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
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8393
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We can only reduce the direction of causation to the direction of time if we are realist about the latter [Tooley]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
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8390
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Causation is directly observable in pressure on one's body, and in willed action [Tooley]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
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8392
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Probabilist laws are compatible with effects always or never happening [Tooley]
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8399
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The actual cause may not be the most efficacious one [Tooley]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
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8391
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In counterfactual worlds there are laws with no instances, so laws aren't supervenient on actuality [Tooley]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
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8394
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Explaining causation in terms of laws can't explain the direction of causation [Tooley]
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8398
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Causation is a concept of a relation the same in all worlds, so it can't be a physical process [Tooley]
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
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13595
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Laws don't exist in the world; they are true of the world [Ellis]
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
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13566
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A proton must have its causal role, because without it it wouldn't be a proton [Ellis]
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13579
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What is most distinctive of scientific essentialism is regarding processes as natural kinds [Ellis]
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13581
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Scientific essentialism is more concerned with explanation than with identity (Locke, not Kripke) [Ellis]
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13594
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The ontological fundamentals are dispositions, and also categorical (spatio-temporal and structural) properties [Ellis]
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
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13603
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A primary aim of science is to show the limits of the possible [Ellis]
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