Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Causation', 'Causes and Conditions' and 'works'
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19 ideas
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
8405
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A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H]
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8427
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I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
8337
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Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
8342
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Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
8343
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Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie]
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8385
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A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane]
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8335
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Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie]
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8336
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The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
8333
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A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie]
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10392
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It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis]
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8419
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The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
8421
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Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
8395
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Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley]
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8334
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The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
17525
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The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird]
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17524
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Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird]
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8397
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Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis]
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8423
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My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis]
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8426
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One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis]
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