Combining Texts
Ideas for
'Causation', 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom' and 'Nature and Observability of Causal Relations'
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18 ideas
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
8367
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Causation is defined in terms of a single sequence, and constant conjunction is no part of it [Ducasse]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
8405
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A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H]
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8427
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I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
8372
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We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them [Ducasse]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
8369
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Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon [Ducasse]
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8373
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When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage [Ducasse]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
8370
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A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse]
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10392
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It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis]
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8419
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The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
8371
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Recurrence is only relevant to the meaning of law, not to the meaning of cause [Ducasse]
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8421
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Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
8374
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We are interested in generalising about causes and effects purely for practical purposes [Ducasse]
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26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
17525
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The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird]
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17524
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Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird]
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8397
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Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis]
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8423
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My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis]
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8426
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One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis]
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26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
4795
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Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis]
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