Combining Texts

Ideas for 'The Case for Closure', 'Getting Causes from Powers' and 'Causation and Explanation'

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23 ideas

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
4403 We can't base our account of causation on explanation, because it is the wrong way round [Psillos]
4399 Causes clearly make a difference, are recipes for events, explain effects, and are evidence [Psillos]
4400 Theories of causation are based either on regularity, or on intrinsic relations of properties [Psillos]
14566 Causation by absence is not real causation, but part of our explanatory practices [Mumford/Anjum]
14577 Causation may not be transitive. Does a fire cause itself to be extinguished by the sprinklers? [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
4789 Three divisions of causal theories: generalist/singularist, intrinsic/extrinsic, reductive/non-reductive [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
14563 Causation is the passing around of powers [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 6. Causation as primitive
14587 We take causation to be primitive, as it is hard to see how it could be further reduced [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
4790 If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect [Psillos]
14533 Causation doesn't have two distinct relata; it is a single unfolding process [Mumford/Anjum]
14558 A collision is a process, which involves simultaneous happenings, but not instantaneous ones [Mumford/Anjum]
14559 Does causation need a third tying ingredient, or just two that meet, or might there be a single process? [Mumford/Anjum]
14565 Sugar dissolving is a process taking time, not one event and then another [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
14567 Privileging one cause is just an epistemic or pragmatic matter, not an ontological one [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
14537 Coincidence is conjunction without causation; smoking causing cancer is the reverse [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
4402 Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law [Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
4774 Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession [Psillos]
14573 Occasionally a cause makes no difference (pre-emption, perhaps) so the counterfactual is false [Mumford/Anjum]
14572 Is a cause because of counterfactual dependence, or is the dependence because there is a cause? [Mumford/Anjum]
14574 Cases of preventing a prevention may give counterfactual dependence without causation [Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
14539 Nature can be interfered with, so a cause never necessitates its effects [Mumford/Anjum]
14550 We assert causes without asserting that they necessitate their effects [Mumford/Anjum]
14546 Necessary causation should survive antecedent strengthening, but no cause can always survive that [Mumford/Anjum]