Combining Texts
Ideas for
'poems', 'Causes and Conditions' and 'The Ethics'
expand these ideas
|
start again
|
choose
another area for these texts
display all the ideas for this combination of texts
18 ideas
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
|
17190
|
We can easily think of nature as one individual [Spinoza]
|
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
|
4826
|
Nature has no particular goal in view, and final causes are mere human figments [Spinoza]
|
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
|
1587
|
Spinoza strongly attacked teleology, which is the lifeblood of classical logos [Roochnik on Spinoza]
|
|
1588
|
For Spinoza eyes don't act for purposes, but follow mechanical necessity [Roochnik on Spinoza]
|
|
12731
|
Final causes are figments of human imagination [Spinoza]
|
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
|
4821
|
An infinite line can be marked in feet or inches, so one infinity is twelve times the other [Spinoza]
|
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
|
17177
|
In nature there is just one infinite substance [Spinoza]
|
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 3. Final causes
|
4850
|
A final cause is simply a human desire [Spinoza]
|
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / a. Observation of causation
|
8337
|
Some says mental causation is distinct because we can recognise single occurrences [Mackie]
|
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
|
8342
|
Mackie tries to analyse singular causal statements, but his entities are too vague for events [Kim on Mackie]
|
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
|
8343
|
Necessity and sufficiency are best suited to properties and generic events, not individual events [Kim on Mackie]
|
|
8385
|
A cause is part of a wider set of conditions which suffices for its effect [Mackie, by Crane]
|
|
8335
|
Necessary conditions are like counterfactuals, and sufficient conditions are like factual conditionals [Mackie]
|
|
8336
|
The INUS account interprets single events, and sequences, causally, without laws being known [Mackie]
|
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
|
8333
|
A cause is an Insufficient but Necessary part of an Unnecessary but Sufficient condition [Mackie]
|
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
|
8395
|
Mackie has a nomological account of general causes, and a subjunctive conditional account of single ones [Mackie, by Tooley]
|
|
8334
|
The virus causes yellow fever, and is 'the' cause; sweets cause tooth decay, but they are not 'the' cause [Mackie]
|
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
|
4815
|
From a definite cause an effect necessarily follows [Spinoza]
|