display all the ideas for this combination of texts
7 ideas
14991 | Space has real betweenness and congruence structure (though it is not the Euclidean concepts) [Sider] |
Full Idea: In metaphysics, space is intrinsically structured; the genuine betweenness and congruence relations are privileged in a way that Euclidean-betweenness and Euclidean-congruence are not. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 03.4) | |
A reaction: I note that Einstein requires space to be 'curved', which implies that it is a substance with properties. |
15021 | The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? [Sider] |
Full Idea: The central question in the philosophy of time is: How alike are time and space? | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 11.1) |
15024 | The spotlight theorists accepts eternal time, but with a spotlight of the present moving across it [Sider] |
Full Idea: The spotlight theorist accepts the block universe, but also something in addition: a joint-carving monadic property of presentness, which is possessed by just one moment of time, and which 'moves', to be possessed by later and later times. | |
From: Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the World [2011], 11.9) | |
A reaction: This seems better than the merely detached eternalist view, which seems to ignore the key phenomenon. I just can't comprehend any theory which makes the future as real as the past. |
617 | It is hard to see how either time or movement could come into existence or be destroyed [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is impossible that movement should either come-to-be or be destroyed. The same can be said for time itself, since it is not even possible for there to be an earlier and a later if time does not exist. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1071b06) |
620 | The first mover is necessary, and because it is necessary it is good [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The existence of the first mover is necessary, and in that it is necessary it is good. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1072b10) | |
A reaction: This is the direct antithesis of David Hume's is/ought distinction (that the universe is value-free). |
613 | Even if the world is caused by fate, mind and nature are still prior causes [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Even if luck or the automatic are the cause of the world, mind and nature are prior causes still. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1065b03) |
619 | Something which both moves and is moved is intermediate, so it follows that there must be an unmoved mover [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Since that which is moved and which also moves is an intermediate, it follows that there must be something that moves without being moved. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1072a19) |