display all the ideas for this combination of texts
6 ideas
17960 | Eternalism says all times are equally real, and future and past objects and properties are real [Merricks] |
Full Idea: Eternalism says all times are equally real. Objects existing at past times and objects existing at future times are just as real as objects existing at the present. Properties had at past and future times are as much properties as those at the present. | |
From: Trenton Merricks (Goodbye Growing Block [2006], 1) | |
A reaction: He adds that the present is therefore 'subjective', resulting from one's perspective. Why would eternalists reject their subjective experiences of time, unless they reject all their other subjective experiences as well? |
17961 | Growing block has a subjective present and a growing edge - but these could come apart [Merricks, by PG] |
Full Idea: Merricks argues that the growing block view says that we live in the subjective present, and that there is a growing edge of being, but he then suggests that these two could come apart, and it would make no difference, so the growing block is incoherent. | |
From: report of Trenton Merricks (Goodbye Growing Block [2006], 4) by PG - Db (ideas) | |
A reaction: [I think that is the nub of his argument. I couldn't find a concise summary in his words] |
617 | It is hard to see how either time or movement could come into existence or be destroyed [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: It is impossible that movement should either come-to-be or be destroyed. The same can be said for time itself, since it is not even possible for there to be an earlier and a later if time does not exist. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1071b06) |
620 | The first mover is necessary, and because it is necessary it is good [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: The existence of the first mover is necessary, and in that it is necessary it is good. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1072b10) | |
A reaction: This is the direct antithesis of David Hume's is/ought distinction (that the universe is value-free). |
613 | Even if the world is caused by fate, mind and nature are still prior causes [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Even if luck or the automatic are the cause of the world, mind and nature are prior causes still. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1065b03) |
619 | Something which both moves and is moved is intermediate, so it follows that there must be an unmoved mover [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: Since that which is moved and which also moves is an intermediate, it follows that there must be something that moves without being moved. | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1072a19) |