Combining Texts

Ideas for 'The Fixation of Belief', 'Springs of Action' and 'Timaeus'

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5 ideas

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
Heavenly movements gave us the idea of time, and caused us to inquire about the heavens [Plato]
     Full Idea: Days, months, years and solstices have caused the invention of number, given us the notion of time, and caused us to inquire into the nature of the universe.
     From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 47a)
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
Time came into existence with the heavens, so that there will be a time when they can be dissolved [Plato]
     Full Idea: Time came into being with the heavens, so that they should be dissolved together if ever they are dissolved.
     From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 38c)
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
Clearly the world is good, so its maker must have been concerned with the eternal, not with change [Plato]
     Full Idea: If the world is beautiful and its maker good, he had an eye on the eternal; if not, on that which is subject to change; clearly the world is the fairest of things, and he the best of causes, so it is eternal.
     From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 29a)
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
If the cosmos is an object of perception then it must be continually changing [Plato]
     Full Idea: The cosmos is visible, tangible and corporeal, and therefore perceptible by the senses; therefore it is an object of opinion and sensation, and therefore change and coming into being.
     From: Plato (Timaeus [c.349 BCE], 28d)
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce]
     Full Idea: It is probably of more advantage to an animal to have his mind filled with pleasing and encouraging visions, independently of their truth; and thus, upon unpractical subjects, natural selection might occasion a fallacious tendency of thought.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p. 8)
     A reaction: Note that this is a pragmatist saying that a set of beliefs might work fine but be untrue. So Peirce does not have the highly relativistic notion of truth of some later pragmatists. Good for him. Note the early date to be thinking about Darwin.