Combining Texts

Ideas for 'The Fixation of Belief', 'fragments/reports' and 'Mental Acts: their content and their objects'

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4 ideas

27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
There is no real motion, only the appearance of it [Melissus, by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: There is no such thing as real motion, but there only appears to be such.
     From: report of Melissus (fragments/reports [c.443 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09.4.3
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
The void is not required for change, because a plenum can alter in quality [Aristotle on Melissus]
     Full Idea: There is no need for void to be the cause of all change, because it is perfectly possible for a plenum to alter qualitatively (which is something Melissus overlooked).
     From: comment on Melissus (fragments/reports [c.443 BCE]) by Aristotle - Physics 214a27
     A reaction: In modern physics this presumably gives us fluctuations in a force field. Motion is like a cat being digested by a python. The atomist claim that emptiness is needed if anything is to move still has intuitive appeal.
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
Nothing could come out of nothing [Melissus]
     Full Idea: If Nothing existed, in no way could anything come into being out of nothing.
     From: Melissus (fragments/reports [c.443 BCE], B1), quoted by (who?) - where?
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce]
     Full Idea: It is probably of more advantage to an animal to have his mind filled with pleasing and encouraging visions, independently of their truth; and thus, upon unpractical subjects, natural selection might occasion a fallacious tendency of thought.
     From: Charles Sanders Peirce (The Fixation of Belief [1877], p. 8)
     A reaction: Note that this is a pragmatist saying that a set of beliefs might work fine but be untrue. So Peirce does not have the highly relativistic notion of truth of some later pragmatists. Good for him. Note the early date to be thinking about Darwin.