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Ideas for 'works', 'Two Problems for Essentialism' and 'Letters to Samuel Clarke'

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5 ideas

27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / c. Conservation of energy
20965 Leibniz upheld conservations of momentum and energy [Leibniz, by Papineau]
     Full Idea: In place of Descartes's conservation of 'quantity of motion', Leibniz upheld both the conservation of linear momentum and the conservation of kinetic energy.
     From: report of Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 5th paper) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness App 2
     A reaction: The point is that momentum involves velocity (which includes direction) rather than speed. Leibniz more or less invented the concept of 'energy' ('vis viva'). Papineau says these two leave no room for causation by mental substance.
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
2103 The idea that the universe could be moved forward with no other change is just a fantasy [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: To say that God could cause the universe to move forward in a straight line or otherwise without changing it in any other way is another fanciful supposition.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 4.14)
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
2100 Space and time are purely relative [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: I have more than once stated that I held space to be something purely relative, like time.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 3.4)
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
2107 No time exists except instants, and instants are not even a part of time, so time does not exist [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: How could a thing exist, no part of which ever exists? In the case of time, nothing exists but instants, and an instant is not even a part of time.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 5.49)
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
2101 If everything in the universe happened a year earlier, there would be no discernible difference [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: To ask why God did not make everything a year sooner would be reasonable if time were something apart from temporal things, but time is just the succession of things, which remains the same if the universe is created a year sooner.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Samuel Clarke [1716], 3.6)