Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Remarks on the definition and nature of mathematics', 'Resurrecting Biological Essentialism' and 'The Flow of Time'

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5 ideas

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism

22974	Presentists lack the materials for a realist view of change [Price,H]
	Full Idea: The presentist view seems to have lost the materials for a realist view of passage, change or temporal transition.
	From: Huw Price (The Flow of Time [2011], 2)
	A reaction: It is a nice point. How can a presentist talk of change if the only component that exists is the present time slice? Price says change can only be a kind of fiction for the presentist. Change in existence and in properties are distinct concepts.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series

22973	The present moment, time's direction, and time's dynamic quality seem to be objective facts [Price,H]
	Full Idea: The flow of time seems to be an objective feature of reality because of 1) the present moment can be objectively distinguished, 2) time has an objective direction, of earlier and later, and 3) there is something objectively dynamic about time.
	From: Huw Price (The Flow of Time [2011], 1.1)
	A reaction: Price sets out to undermine all three of these claims, in implicit defence of a psychological view. I disagree with him.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow

22975	We must explain either the existence of a time direction, or our psychological sense of it [Price,H]
	Full Idea: If the world comes equipped with a time orientation, where does it come from? If it doesn't, what explains our psychological feeling of a direction for time?
	From: Huw Price (The Flow of Time [2011], 3.5)
	A reaction: The chances of 'explaining' either one look slim to me. That is, the fact would explain our experience, but the experience without the fact looks ridiculous, and I cannot conceive of any time-free entity which could explain the fact.

27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species

17369	We name species as small to share properties, but large enough to yield generalisations [Devitt]
	Full Idea: Our explanatory purposes in introducing a name for a species demand that we draw the lines around a group that is small enough to share a whole lot of important properties and large enough to yield broad generalizations.
	From: Michael Devitt (Resurrecting Biological Essentialism [2008], 10 'Arb')
	A reaction: Grist to my mill. In this reaction slot (16th Oct 2013) I launch my new metaphysical school - welcome to EXPLANATIONISM! Folk metaphysics, and the best philosophical metaphysics, is entirely driven by the needs of explanation.

17367	Species are phenetic, biological, niche, or phylogenetic-cladistic [Devitt, by PG]
	Full Idea: The four main concepts of a species are 'phenetic' (similarity of traits), 'biological species' (interbreeding and isolated), 'ecological niche' (occupying an adaptive zone), or 'phylogenetic-cladistic' (start and finish at splits in lineage)
	From: report of Michael Devitt (Resurrecting Biological Essentialism [2008], 4) by PG - Db (ideas)
	A reaction: [my summary of Devitt's list] Devitt attacks the whole lot, in favour of essentialism - the species being fixed by its underlying explanatory mechanisms.