Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Natural Kinds and Biological Realism', 'Logic for Philosophy' and 'Phaedo'

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3 ideas

27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
If the Earth is spherical and in the centre, it is kept in place by universal symmetry, not by force [Plato]
     Full Idea: If the earth is spherical and in the middle of the heavens, it needs neither air nor force to keep it from falling. The uniformity of heaven and equilibrium of earth are sufficient support.
     From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 108e)
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt]
     Full Idea: The signs are that the higher categories are not natural kinds and so the Linnaean hierarchy must be abandoned. ...This is not abandoning a hierarchy altogether, it is not abandoning a tree of life.
     From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 6)
     A reaction: Devitt's underlying point is that the higher and more general kinds do not have an essence (a specific nature), which is the qualification to be a natural kind. They explain nothing. Essence is the hallmark of natural kinds. Hmmm.
Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt]
     Full Idea: Species pluralism is the view that there are several equally good accounts of what it is to be a species.
     From: Michael Devitt (Natural Kinds and Biological Realism [2009], 7)
     A reaction: Devitt votes for it, and cites Dupré, among many other. Given the existence of rival accounts, all making good points, it is hard to resist this view.