Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Universal Prescriptivism', 'Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier' and 'What Required for Foundation for Maths?'

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2 ideas

27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: The notion of force is as clear as that of action and passion, because it is that from which action follows when nothing prevents it.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier [1691], A1.6.226), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4
     A reaction: For Leibniz, force seems to be a metaphysical notion, rather than a feature of the physical world. I take it to be the bottom level of explanation, and it equates with Aristotelian form and essence.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
Time doesn't exist, since its parts don't coexist [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: Time never exists, since all of its parts never exist together.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier [1691], A1.6.226), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4
     A reaction: The problem here is that he seems to be admitting that time has 'parts'. Can something have parts and not exist? Events will also fail to exist by this criterion, though we could hardly deny that events (or some such) 'happen'.