display all the ideas for this combination of texts
3 ideas
| 22286 | Existence is not a first-level concept (of God), but a second-level property of concepts [Frege, by Potter] |
| Full Idea: For Frege (unlike Kant) existence is a genuine concept, but of the second level, not the first. Since God's perfections are of the first level, existence is not a candidate to be one of them. | |
| From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §053) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 09 'App' | |
| A reaction: That is, God's perfections are of God, but existence is a concept of concepts (that they are instantiated). So existence is a metaconcept. I'm not convinced. If I bake a successful cake, its existence is its most wonderful feature. |
| 8644 | Because existence is a property of concepts the ontological argument for God fails [Frege] |
| Full Idea: Because existence is a property of concepts the ontological argument for the existence of God breaks down. | |
| From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §53) | |
| A reaction: The point being that existence (like number) is not a property of actual things. His proposition sounds rather dubious. The concept of unicorns exists quite entertainingly; it is the failure of actual unicorns to exist that is so heartbreaking. |
| 6119 | You can discuss 'God exists', so 'God' is a description, not a name [Russell] |
| Full Idea: The fact that you can discuss the proposition 'God exists' is a proof that 'God', as used in that proposition, is a description and not a name. If 'God' were a name, no question as to its existence could arise. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §VI) | |
| A reaction: Presumably 'a being than which none greater can be conceived' (Anselm's definition) is self-evidently a description, and doesn't claim to be a name. Aquinas caps each argument with a triumphant naming of the being he has proved. |