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4 ideas
16165 | For Aristotle God is defined in an axiom, for which there is no proof [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
Full Idea: Aristotle is committed to the view that strictly speaking there is no proof of the essence and existence of God. There will be a real definition of him as an axiom of special theology, and then a deduction of theological theorems. | |
From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], God) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Conception of Metaphysics p.94 | |
A reaction: The cynical response would be 'why not start with a Great White Rabbit, then?', but I presume one must read what Aristotle says (late in 'Metaphysics') to understand why this particular axiom is chosen. Economy, power etc.? |
22286 | Existence is not a first-level concept (of God), but a second-level property of concepts [Frege, by Potter] |
Full Idea: For Frege (unlike Kant) existence is a genuine concept, but of the second level, not the first. Since God's perfections are of the first level, existence is not a candidate to be one of them. | |
From: report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §053) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 09 'App' | |
A reaction: That is, God's perfections are of God, but existence is a concept of concepts (that they are instantiated). So existence is a metaconcept. I'm not convinced. If I bake a successful cake, its existence is its most wonderful feature. |
8644 | Because existence is a property of concepts the ontological argument for God fails [Frege] |
Full Idea: Because existence is a property of concepts the ontological argument for the existence of God breaks down. | |
From: Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], §53) | |
A reaction: The point being that existence (like number) is not a property of actual things. His proposition sounds rather dubious. The concept of unicorns exists quite entertainingly; it is the failure of actual unicorns to exist that is so heartbreaking. |
610 | The world can't be arranged at all if there is nothing eternal and separate [Aristotle] |
Full Idea: How is there to be an arrangement of the world at all, in the absence of something eternal, separable and permanent? | |
From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1060a21) |