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Ideas for 'Metaphysics', 'talk' and 'Summa Theologicae'

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12 ideas

28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature

622	There must a source of movement which is eternal, indivisible and without magnitude [Aristotle]
	Full Idea: There exists an eternal unmoved substance separate from sensible things. It can have no magnitude, and is without parts and indivisible. As the source of movement for infinite time, it must itself be infinite.
	From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1073a05)

28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time

7603	God is not a creator (involving time and change) and is not concerned with the inferior universe [Aristotle, by Armstrong,K]
	Full Idea: Aristotle's god had not created the world, since this would involve an inappropriate change and temporal activity; everything yearns towards god, but god remains indifferent, since he cannot contemplate anything inferior to himself.
	From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], God) by Karen Armstrong - A History of God Ch.1
	A reaction: Trust Aristotle to come up with the only rational and consistent account of a deity anyone has ever offered. Endless paradoxes and inconsistencies arise if god steps into time, makes things, changes, and responds to prayers.

28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question

23178	Divine law commands some things because they are good, while others are good because commanded [Aquinas]
	Full Idea: The divine law commands certain things because they are good and forbids others because they are evil, while others are good because they are prescribed, and others evil because they are forbidden.
	From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], II-II Q57 2)
	A reaction: This is a fifty-fifty response to the Euthyphro dilemma, but it seems to leave the theological puzzle of the source of the goodness which is prescribed because it is in fact good.

28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God

16165	For Aristotle God is defined in an axiom, for which there is no proof [Aristotle, by Frede,M]
	Full Idea: Aristotle is committed to the view that strictly speaking there is no proof of the essence and existence of God. There will be a real definition of him as an axiom of special theology, and then a deduction of theological theorems.
	From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], God) by Michael Frede - Aristotle's Conception of Metaphysics p.94
	A reaction: The cynical response would be 'why not start with a Great White Rabbit, then?', but I presume one must read what Aristotle says (late in 'Metaphysics') to understand why this particular axiom is chosen. Economy, power etc.?

28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique

21251	We can't know God's essence, so his existence can't be self-evident for us [Aquinas]
	Full Idea: Because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition 'God exists' is not self-evident to us, but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us.
	From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Art 1, Obj 3)
	A reaction: Depends on his definition of self-evidence (Idea 21250), which needs knowledge of the essence of the subject. Anselm required 'understanding' of the concept. One might understand the existence criteria without knowing the whole essence. Anselm wins.

28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof

5614	If you assume that there must be a necessary being, you can't say which being has this quality [Kant on Aquinas]
	Full Idea: To those who assume the existence of a necessary being, and would only know which among all things had to be regarded as such a thing, one could not answer: This thing here is the necessary being
	From: comment on Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265]) by Immanuel Kant - Critique of Pure Reason A612/B640
	A reaction: See Aquinas in Idea 1431. Kant makes a nice point. You might turn out to be the necessary being? How could you tell? You only know that there must be one lurking somewhere. I could be a slug. Aquinas makes a huge leap to God.

21269	Way 1: the infinite chain of potential-to-actual movement has to have a first mover [Aquinas]
	Full Idea: A thing can only be reduced from potentiality to actuality by something actual. A thing can never be in actuality and potentiality in the same respect. So what is moved must be moved by another. But this cannot go on to infinity, with no first mover.
	From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply)
	A reaction: [compressed] This relies on the Aristotelian ideas of potentiality and actuality. We might talk about things moving, but lacking the 'power' to move. This is almost identical to Plato in 'The Laws' (which I guess Aquinas knew nothing of).

21270	Way 2: no effect without a cause, and this cannot go back to infinity, so there is First Cause [Aquinas]
	Full Idea: If there is no first cause among efficient causes, there is no ultimate or intermediate cause. That in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity is plainly false. So it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, which everyone calls God.
	From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply)
	A reaction: [compressed] It doesn't seem to follow at all that the First Cause is God. There could be a single thing like the Phoenix, with unique self-causing properties. Or a quantum fluctuation.

21271	Way 3: contingent beings eventually vanish, so continuity needs a necessary being [Aquinas]
	Full Idea: That which can not-be at some time is not. So if everything can not-be, then once there was nothing in existence. If so, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist. So there must be some being having of itself its own necessity.
	From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply)
	A reaction: [compressed] Why can't things take it in turns to not-be, so that something is always on duty? Maybe it is a feature of things that they bring other things into existence (e.g. virtual particles)?

21272	Way 4: the source of all qualities is their maximum, so something (God) causes all perfections [Aquinas]
	Full Idea: More and less are predicated of different things according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum. The maximum of a genus is the cause of all in that genus. So there must be something causing the perfections of all beings.
	From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply)
	A reaction: [compressed] The argument makes a startling jump from each quality (like heat or nobility) having a maximum, to their being a single entity (a 'being' at that) which is the sole source of all human perfections.

28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof

610	The world can't be arranged at all if there is nothing eternal and separate [Aristotle]
	Full Idea: How is there to be an arrangement of the world at all, in the absence of something eternal, separable and permanent?
	From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1060a21)

21273	Way 5: mindless things act towards an obvious end, so there is an intelligent director [Aquinas]
	Full Idea: Things which lack knowledge, such as natural bodies, act for an end, which is usually in the same way, to obtain the best result. Hence they achieve their end designedly. Hence some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed.
	From: Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologicae [1265], Ia,Q02,Art3,Reply)
	A reaction: [compressed] This is Greek teleology with a vengeance. Plants probably illustrate best what he has in mind. There is obvious teleology in human affairs, and there is a sort of teleology in living things, but we take the end to be reinforced by success.