Combining Texts

Ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'The Consolations of Philosophy' and 'Introduction to 'Properties''

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4 ideas

28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
Divine eternity is the all-at-once and complete possession of unending life [Boethius]
     Full Idea: Divine eternity is the all-at-once [tota simul] and complete possession of unending life.
     From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], V.6), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 18.1
     A reaction: This is a famous definition, and 'tota simul' became the phrase used for 'entia successiva', such as a day, or the Olympic Games.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
Where does evil come from if there is a god; where does good come from if there isn't? [Boethius]
     Full Idea: A philosopher (possibly Epicurus) asked where evil comes from if there is a god, and where good comes from if there isn't.
     From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], I.IV)
     A reaction: A nice question. The best known answer to the first question is 'Satan'. Some would say that in the second case good is impossible, but I would have thought that the only possible answer is 'mankind'.
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
God is the good [Boethius]
     Full Idea: God is the good.
     From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], III.XI)
     A reaction: This summary follows on from the rather dubious discussion in Idea 5757. If God IS the good, it is not clear how God could be usefully described as 'good'. We would know that he was good a priori, without any enquiry into his nature being needed.
God is the supreme good, so no source of goodness could take precedence over God [Boethius]
     Full Idea: That which by its own nature is something distinct from supreme good, cannot be supreme good. ..It is impossible for anything to be by nature better than that from which it is derived, so that which is the origin of all things is supreme good.
     From: Boethius (The Consolations of Philosophy [c.520], III.X)
     A reaction: This is the contortion early Christians got into once they decided God had to be 'supreme' in the moral world (and every other world). Boethius allows a possible external source of all morality, but then has to say that this source is morally inferior.