display all the ideas for this combination of texts
5 ideas
| 12570 | The finite and dependent should obey the supreme and infinite [Locke] |
| Full Idea: It is certain that the inferior, finite and dependent is under an obligation to obey the supreme and infinite. | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.13.03) | |
| A reaction: Locke's liberal politics has gradually helped to undermine this view. Once an inferior and dependent person owns some property, they acquire rights and do not have to submit to anyone in that respect. Modern people would defy God if they met Him. |
| 12565 | God has given us no innate idea of himself [Locke] |
| Full Idea: God has given us no innate idea of himself. | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.10.01) | |
| A reaction: This is rejection of Descartes' 'Trademark Argument' (Idea 2274). It is consistent with Locke's general assault on all innate ideas, as you might expect from an empiricist. |
| 234 | We couldn't discuss the non-existence of the One without knowledge of it [Plato] |
| Full Idea: There must be knowledge of the one, or else not even the meaning of the words 'if the one does not exist' would be known. | |
| From: Plato (Parmenides [c.364 BCE], 160d) |
| 12566 | We exist, so there is Being, which requires eternal being [Locke] |
| Full Idea: Everyone's certain knowledge assures him that he is something that actually exists. ...Therefore there is some real Being, and since non-entity cannot produce any real being, it is an evident demonstration that from Eternity there has been something. | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.10.03) | |
| A reaction: This is a cosmological proof, deriving God as a necessary precondition from the observation that something exists. It is similar to, but not as good as, Aquinas's Third Way (Idea 1431). |
| 12571 | If miracles aim at producing belief, it is plausible that their events are very unusual [Locke] |
| Full Idea: Where such supernatural events are suitable to ends aim'd at by him who has the power to change the course of nature, they may be fitter to procure belief by how much more they are beyond or contrary to ordinary observation. | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.16.13) | |
| A reaction: On this occasion there is flat disagreement with Hume, who produced a famous objection to the whole idea of miracles. Locke is struggling here, since he is defending events which are totally contrary to the rest of his epistemology. |