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2 ideas
8820 | Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock] |
Full Idea: Rather than truth being fundamental and rules for reasoning being derived from it, the rules for reasoning come first and truth is characterized by the rules for reasoning about truth. | |
From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Cog.Mach') | |
A reaction: This nicely disturbs our complacency about such things. There is plenty of reasoning in Homer, but I bet there is no talk of 'truth'. Pontius Pilate seems to have been a pioneer (Idea 8821). Do the truth tables define or describe logical terms? |
8819 | We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock] |
Full Idea: It might be wondered why we even have a concept of truth. The answer is that this concept is required for defeasible reasoning. | |
From: John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Cog.Mach') | |
A reaction: His point is that we must be able to think critically about our beliefs ('is p true?') if we are to have any knowledge at all. An excellent point. Give that man a teddy bear. |