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Ideas for 'Metaphysics', 'Intro to 2nd ed of Principia Mathematica' and 'The Ethics'

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3 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object [Spinoza]
     Full Idea: A true idea must correspond with its ideate or object.
     From: Baruch de Spinoza (The Ethics [1675], I Ax 6)
     A reaction: Allowing for his usage of 'idea' and 'object', this seems to be a straightforward commitment to the modern correspondence theory, perhaps the earliest clear statement of it. I agree with him.
Falsity says that which is isn't, and that which isn't is; truth says that which is is, and that which isn't isn't [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Falsity is the assertion that that which is is not or that that which is not is, and truth is the assertion that that which is is and that that which is not is not.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1011b20)
     A reaction: It was very startling to discover Plato's Idea 13776, and realise that this famous and much-quoted idea of Aristotle's was not original to him. I find it very hard to disagree with any aspect of the idea.
Aristotle's truth formulation concerns referring parts of sentences, not sentences as wholes [Aristotle, by Davidson]
     Full Idea: Aristotle's formulation postulates no entities like facts. The things of which we say that they are or that they are not are the entities adverted to by the referring parts of sentences, not by sentences as wholes.
     From: report of Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1011b21) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 6
     A reaction: Aristotle seems to refer to the existences or non-existences of things. Presumably this would mean referring not to an apple, but to a red apple or a green apple, seen as two different things, even though they were the 'same' apple?