Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Metaphysics', 'works' and 'Outline of a Theory of Truth'

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4 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Truth is either intuiting a way of being, or a putting together [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: Truth is either a putting-together or, if the thing has being, it has it in a certain way. Truth for these things is intuiting them.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1051b30)
     A reaction: This seems to confirm what Aristotle says in Idea 10914, that there are two aspects to truth - the immediate grasp of atomic facts, and the assembling of complex facts. This resembles Tarski's construction of truth for complex sentences.
Simple and essential truth seems to be given, with further truth arising in thinking [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: It is not in states of affairs that truth and falsity arise but in thinking. And for things that are simple and for essences, truth and falsity do not even arise in thinking.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1027b27)
     A reaction: This might be viewed in the light of Tarski's theory, and the distinction between atomic sentences, which are just accepted, with a recursive account of more complex statements. Aristotle seems to have two theories of truth here (Cf. Idea 10916).
Truth is a matter of asserting correct combinations and separations [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: That which is as being true (and that which is not as being false) have to do with composition and division, ... (for truth involves assertion in the case of combination and denial in the case of a separation).
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1027b22)
     A reaction: This remark has the prospect of being spelled out precisely in terms of predication in modern logic
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
If one error is worse than another, it must be because it is further from the truth [Aristotle]
     Full Idea: The man who mistakes a tetrad for a pentad is not as erroneous as he who takes it for a chiliad. But then, if they are not equally erroneous, this can only mean that one has less, and so one more, of the truth.
     From: Aristotle (Metaphysics [c.324 BCE], 1008b32)