display all the ideas for this combination of texts
2 ideas
| 13000 | Truth is correspondence between mental propositions and what they are about [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Let us be content with looking for truth in the correspondence between the propositions which are in the mind and the things which they are about. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (New Essays on Human Understanding [1704], 4.05) | |
| A reaction: In an age when the nature of truth was hardly debated, and theories such as coherence and pragmatism, never mind semantic accounts, were unthought of, it is interesting to see that correspondence seems obvious to Leibniz. Correct! |
| 9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
| Full Idea: Even if talk of truth as correspondence to the facts is metaphorical, it is a bad metaphor for analytic truth in a way that it is not for synthetic truth. | |
| From: Timothy Williamson (The Philosophy of Philosophy [2007], 3.1) | |
| A reaction: A very simple and rather powerful point. Maybe the word 'truth' should be withheld from such cases. You might say that accepted analytic truths are 'conventional'. If that is wrong, then they correspond to natural facts at a high level of abstraction. |