display all the ideas for this combination of texts
6 ideas
23291 | Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Without a grasp of the concept of truth, not only language, but thought itself, is impossible. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], p.16) | |
A reaction: Davidson never mentions animals, but I like this idea because it points to importance of truth for animals as well. I say that truth is relevant to any mind that makes judgements - and quite small animals (e.g. ants and spiders) make judgements. |
23284 | Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Plato's conflation of abstract universals with entities of supreme value reinforced the confusion of truth with the most eminent truths. …The only perfect exemplar of a Form is the Form itself, …and only truth itself is completely true. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], p.3) | |
A reaction: Even non-subscribers to Plato often talk as if there were some grand thing called the Truth with a capital T, quite often used in a religious context. Truth is the hallmark of successful (non-fanciful) thought. |
23286 | Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Since it is neither visible as a target, nor recognisable when achieved, there is no point in calling truth a goal. We should only aim at increasing confidence in our beliefs, by collecting further evidence or checking our calculations. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], P.6) | |
A reaction: This is mainly aimed at pragmatists, but Davidson obviously subscribes (as do I) to their fallibilist view of knowledge. |
23292 | Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Correspondence, while it is empty as a definition, does capture the thought that truth depends on how the world is. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], p.16) | |
A reaction: Just don't try to give a precise account of the correspondence between two things (thoughts and facts) which are so utterly different in character. |
23288 | When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson] |
Full Idea: We have to wonder how we know that it is some single concept which Tarski indicates how to define for each of a number of well-behaved languages. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], P.11) | |
A reaction: Davidson says that Tarski makes the assumption that it is a single concept, but fails to demonstrate the fact. This resembles Frege's Julius Caesar problem - of how you know whether your number definition has defined a number. |
23287 | Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson] |
Full Idea: Disquotation cannot pretend to give a complete account of the concept of truth, since it works only in the special case where the metalanguage contains the object language. Neither can contain their own truth predicate. | |
From: Donald Davidson (Truth Rehabilitated [1997], p.10) | |
A reaction: Presumably more sophisticated and complete accounts would need a further account of translation between languages - which explains Quine's interest in that topic. […see this essay, p.12] |