display all the ideas for this combination of texts
5 ideas
| 3883 | A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton] |
| Full Idea: A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition: no truth is contradicted by another. | |
| From: Roger Scruton (Modern Philosophy:introduction and survey [1994], 9.1) | |
| A reaction: Interesting. It resembles the rule that if you always tell the truth you don't need to remember what you said. Close to the heart of the concept of truth. Coherence and correspondence. |
| 12549 | Nothing is so beautiful to the eye as truth is to the mind [Locke] |
| Full Idea: Nothing is so beautiful to the eye as truth is to the mind. | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.03.20) | |
| A reaction: This is historically interesting, if we ask whether anyone in the centuries preceding Locke would ever have written such a remark. A deep historical question is why the value of pure truth went up so sharply in the early Enlightenment. |
| 12558 | Truth only belongs to mental or verbal propositions [Locke] |
| Full Idea: Truth only belongs to propositions: whereof there are two sorts, viz. mental and verbal | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.05.02) | |
| A reaction: I think it is important to retain 'mental' propositions, so that animals are allowed to think correctly or wrongly about things. I don't think Locke gives much thought to the ontological status of propositions. |
| 12522 | It is propositions which are true or false, though it is sometimes said of ideas [Locke] |
| Full Idea: Truth and falsehood belong, in propriety of speech, only to propositions; yet ideas are oftentimes termed 'true' or 'false ...though I think there is still some secret or tacit proposition. | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.32.01) | |
| A reaction: It is not quite clear, I think, what Locke means by 'proposition'. If it means sentences, then there are lots of problem cases like 'I am ill' (who is speaking?). I demand a theory of truth that allows animals to think truths. See Idea 12523. |
| 12523 | If they refer to real substances, 'man' is a true idea and 'centaur' a false one [Locke] |
| Full Idea: The two ideas, of a man and a centaur, supposed to be the ideas of real substances, are the one true and the other false. | |
| From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.32.05) | |
| A reaction: Locke says (Idea 12522) that there is probably a proposition hidden behind this. We might say that 'man' has a reference and 'centaur' does not (strictly). Is successful reference a species of truth? 'Pick out the llama' - child points - 'that's right!' |