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3 ideas
6090 | Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences [Russell] |
Full Idea: A fact is the kind of thing that makes a proposition true or false, …and it is the sort of thing that is expressed by a whole sentence, not by a single name like 'Socrates'. | |
From: Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918], §I) | |
A reaction: It is important to note a point here which I consider vital - that Russell keeps the idea of a fact quite distinct from the language in which it is expressed. Facts are a 'sort of thing', of the kind which are now referred to as 'truth-makers'. |
18348 | Not only atomic truths, but also general and negative truths, have truth-makers [Russell, by Rami] |
Full Idea: In 1918 Russell held that beside atomic truths, also general and negative truths have truth-makers. | |
From: report of Bertrand Russell (The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) by Adolph Rami - Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making note 04 |
12463 | Unlike correspondence, truthmaking can be one truth to many truthmakers, or vice versa [Jacobs] |
Full Idea: I assume a form of truthmaking theory, ..which is a many-many relation, unlike, say correspondence, so that one entity can make multiple truths true and one truth can have multiple truthmakers. | |
From: Jonathan D. Jacobs (A Powers Theory of Modality [2010], §1) | |
A reaction: This sounds like common sense, once you think about it. One tree makes many things true, and one statement about trees is made true by many trees. |