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3 ideas
15063 | Some sentences depend for their truth on worldly circumstances, and others do not [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: There is a distinction between worldly and unworldly sentences, between sentences that depend for their truth upon the worldly circumstances and those that do not. | |
From: Kit Fine (Necessity and Non-Existence [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: Fine is fishing around in the area between the necessary, the a priori, truthmakers, and truth-conditions. He appears to be attempting a singlehanded reconstruction of the concepts of metaphysics. Is he major, or very marginal? |
18915 | If facts are the truthmakers, they are not in the world [Engelbretsen] |
Full Idea: If there are such things as truthmakers (facts), they are not to be found in the world. As Strawson would say to Austin: there is the cat, there is the mat, but where in the world is the fact that the cat is on the mat? | |
From: George Engelbretsen (Trees, Terms and Truth [2005], 4) | |
A reaction: He cites Strawson, Quine and Davidson for this point. |
18919 | There are no 'falsifying' facts, only an absence of truthmakers [Engelbretsen] |
Full Idea: A false proposition is not made false by anything like a 'falsifying' fact. A false proposition simply fails to be made true by any fact. | |
From: George Engelbretsen (Trees, Terms and Truth [2005], 4) | |
A reaction: Sounds good. In truthmaker theory, one truth-value (T) is 'made', but the other one is not, so there is no symmetry between the two. Better to talk of T and not-T? See ideas on Excluded Middle. |