19076
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Coherence theories differ over the coherence relation, and over the set of proposition with which to cohere [Young,JO]
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Full Idea:
Coherence theories of truth differ on their accounts of the coherence relation, and on their accounts of the set (or sets) of propositions with which true propositions occur (the 'specified set').
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From:
James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §1)
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A reaction:
Coherence is clearly more than consistency or mutual entailment, and I like to invoke explanation. The set has to be large, or the theory is absurd (as two absurdities can 'cohere'). So very large, or very very large, or maximally large?
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19077
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Two propositions could be consistent with your set, but inconsistent with one another [Young,JO]
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Full Idea:
It is unsatisfactory for the coherence relation to be consistency, because two propositions could be consistent with a 'specified set', and yet be inconsistent with each other. That would imply they are both true, which is impossible.
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From:
James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §1)
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A reaction:
I'm not convinced by this. You first accept P because it is consistent with the set; then Q turns up, which is consistent with everything in the set except P. So you have to choose between them, and might eject P. Your set was too small.
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19078
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Coherence with actual beliefs, or our best beliefs, or ultimate ideal beliefs? [Young,JO]
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Full Idea:
One extreme for the specified set is the largest consistent set of propositions currently believed by actual people. A moderate position makes it the limit of people's enquiries. The other extreme is what would be believed by an omniscient being.
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From:
James O. Young (The Coherence Theory of Truth [2013], §1)
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A reaction:
One not considered is the set of propositions believed by each individual person. Thoroughgoing relativists might well embrace that one. Peirce and Putnam liked the moderate one. I'm taken with the last one, since truth is an ideal, not a phenomenon.
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