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4 ideas
13985 | A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle] |
Full Idea: Whereas there might be just one fact that a true proposition was like, we would have to say that a false proposition was unlike any fact. We could not speak of the fact that it was false of, so we could not speak of its being false of anything at all. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Objections') | |
A reaction: Ryle brings out very nicely the point Russell emphasised so much, that the most illuminating studies in philosophy are of how falsehood works, rather than of how truths work. If I say 'the Queen is really a man' it is obvious what that is false of. |
8315 | Maybe facts are just true propositions [Lowe] |
Full Idea: If facts are 'proposition-like' or 'thinkable' (we speak of 'knowing' or 'understanding' facts) might they not simply be true propositions? | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.2) | |
A reaction: They certainly can't be if we are going to use facts as what makes propositions true. The proposal would be empty without out some other account of truth (probably a dubious one). Facts are truth-makers? |
13984 | Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle] |
Full Idea: One map of Sussex is like another, but it is not true of that other map, but only of the county. | |
From: Gilbert Ryle (Are there propositions? [1930], 'Objections') | |
A reaction: One might question whether a map is in any sense 'true' of Sussex, though one must admit that there are good and bad maps of Sussex. The point is a nice one, which shows that there is no simple account of truth as correspondence. |
8319 | One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items [Lowe] |
Full Idea: Where there is one-to-one correspondence there must certainly be countable, and therefore individuable items of some kind. | |
From: E.J. Lowe (The Possibility of Metaphysics [1998], 11.6) | |
A reaction: Lowe is criticising precise notions of 'a fact'. We can respond by relaxing the notion of 'one-to-one', if critics are going to be fussy about exactly what the items are. "There is a huge wave coming" doesn't need a precise notion of a wave to be true. |