Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Meaning and the Moral Sciences', 'A Theory of Conditionals' and 'Contrib to Critique of Hegel's Phil of Right'

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2 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
We need the correspondence theory of truth to understand language and science [Putnam]
     Full Idea: A correspondence theory of truth is needed to understand how language works, and how science works.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Intro)
     A reaction: Putnam retreated from this position to a more pragmatic one later on, but all my sympathies are with the present view, despite being repeatedly told by modern philosophers that I am wrong. See McGinn (Idea 6085) and Searle (Idea 3508).
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Correspondence between concepts and unconceptualised reality is impossible [Putnam]
     Full Idea: The great nineteenth century argument against the correspondence theory of truth was that one cannot think of truth as correspondence to facts (or 'reality') because one would need to compare concepts directly with unconceptualised reality.
     From: Hilary Putnam (Meaning and the Moral Sciences [1978], Pt Three)
     A reaction: Presumably the criticism was offered by idealists, who preferred a coherence theory. The defence is to say that there is a confusion here between a concept and the contents of a concept. The contents of a concept are designed to be facts.