Combining Texts

Ideas for 'Wiener Logik', 'Truth and Truthmakers' and 'Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed)'

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4 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Nothing is so beautiful to the eye as truth is to the mind [Locke]
     Full Idea: Nothing is so beautiful to the eye as truth is to the mind.
     From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.03.20)
     A reaction: This is historically interesting, if we ask whether anyone in the centuries preceding Locke would ever have written such a remark. A deep historical question is why the value of pure truth went up so sharply in the early Enlightenment.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Truth only belongs to mental or verbal propositions [Locke]
     Full Idea: Truth only belongs to propositions: whereof there are two sorts, viz. mental and verbal
     From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 4.05.02)
     A reaction: I think it is important to retain 'mental' propositions, so that animals are allowed to think correctly or wrongly about things. I don't think Locke gives much thought to the ontological status of propositions.
It is propositions which are true or false, though it is sometimes said of ideas [Locke]
     Full Idea: Truth and falsehood belong, in propriety of speech, only to propositions; yet ideas are oftentimes termed 'true' or 'false ...though I think there is still some secret or tacit proposition.
     From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.32.01)
     A reaction: It is not quite clear, I think, what Locke means by 'proposition'. If it means sentences, then there are lots of problem cases like 'I am ill' (who is speaking?). I demand a theory of truth that allows animals to think truths. See Idea 12523.
If they refer to real substances, 'man' is a true idea and 'centaur' a false one [Locke]
     Full Idea: The two ideas, of a man and a centaur, supposed to be the ideas of real substances, are the one true and the other false.
     From: John Locke (Essay Conc Human Understanding (2nd Ed) [1694], 2.32.05)
     A reaction: Locke says (Idea 12522) that there is probably a proposition hidden behind this. We might say that 'man' has a reference and 'centaur' does not (strictly). Is successful reference a species of truth? 'Pick out the llama' - child points - 'that's right!'